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Interconnected smart vehicles offer a range of sophisticated 
services that benefit the vehicle owners, transport authorities, 
car manufacturers and other service providers. This potentially 
exposes smart vehicles to a range of security and privacy 
threats such as location tracking or remote hijacking of the 
vehicle. In this article, we argue that BlockChain (BC), a 
disruptive technology that has found many applications from 
cryptocurrencies to smart contracts, is a potential solution to 
these challenges. We propose a BC-based architecture to 
protect the privacy of the users and to increase the security of 
the vehicular ecosystem. Wireless remote software updates and 
other emerging services such as dynamic vehicle insurance 
fees, are used to illustrate the efficacy of the proposed security 
architecture. We also qualitatively argue the resilience of the 
architecture against common security attacks.  
 
Introduction 
Smart vehicles are increasingly connected to roadside 
infrastructure, e.g. traffic management systems, to other 
vehicles in close proximity, and also more generally to the 
Internet, thus making vehicles part of the Internet of Things 
(IoT). This high degree of connectivity makes it particularly 
challenging to secure smart vehicles. Malicious entities can 
compromise a vehicle, which not only endangers the security 
of the vehicle but also the safety of the passengers. Miller and 
Valasek presented a sophisticated attack on a Jeep Cherokee 
using the wireless interface of the infotainment system 
whereby they were able to remotely control the core functions 
of the vehicle [1]. The data exchanged by the vehicle includes 
sensitive data, e.g., location, and can thus open up new privacy 
challenges.  
Conventional security and privacy methods used in smart 
vehicles tend to be ineffective due to the following challenges:  
• Centralization: Current smart vehicle architectures rely on 
centralised brokered communication models where all 
vehicles are identified, authenticated, authorised, and 
connected through central cloud servers. This model is 
unlikely to scale as large number of vehicles are 
connected. Additionally, the cloud servers will remain a 
bottleneck and a single point of failure that can disrupt the 
entire network.   
• Lack of privacy: Most of the current secure 
communication architectures either do not consider user 
privacy, e.g. they resort to exchanging all data of the 
vehicle without the owner’s permission, or reveal noisy or 
summarized data to the requester. However, in several 
smart vehicle applications, the requester needs precise 
vehicle data to provide personalised services. 
• Safety threats: Smart vehicles have an increasing number 
of autonomous driving functions. A malfunction due to a 
security breach (e.g., by installing malicious SW) could 
lead to serious accidents thereby endangering the safety of 
the passengers and also of other road users in close 
proximity. 
BlockChain (BC) is a distributed database that maintains a 
growing list of blocks that are chained to each other. BC was 
first proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto as the underlying 
technology behind Bitcoin [2]. BC has been shown to possess a 
number of salient features including security, immutability and 
privacy and could thus be a useful technology to address the 
aforementioned challenges. The structure of BC is shown in 
Figure 1. BC is managed distributedly by a peer to peer 
network. Each node is identified using a Public Key (PK). All 
communications between nodes, known as transactions, are 
encrypted using PKs and broadcast to the entire network. Every 
node can verify a transaction, by validating the signature of the 
transaction generator against their PK. This ensures that BC 
can achieve trustless consensus, meaning that an agreement 
between nodes can be achieved without a central trust broker, 
e.g. Certificate Authority (CA). A node will periodically collect 
multiple transactions from its pool of pending transactions to 
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form a block, which is broadcast to the entire network. The 
block is appended to the local copy of the BC stored at a node 
if all constituent transactions are valid. A consensus algorithm 
such as Proof of Work (PoW), which involves solving a hard-
to-solve easy-to-verify puzzle, is employed to control which 
nodes can participate in the BC. Once a block is appended, it 
(or the constituent transactions) cannot be modified, since the 
hash of each block is contained in the subsequent block in the 
chain, which ensures immutability. A node can change its PK 
(i.e. identity) after each transaction to ensure anonymity and 
privacy. 
BC has been used in a wide range of non-monetary 
applications, e.g. verifying proof of location [3]. In 2013, a new 
open-source BC-based platform, called Ethereum [4], was 
proposed to facilitate smart contracts, i.e. computer programs 
for enforcing a set of rules. BlockCharge [5] is a BC-based 
platform for electric vehicle charging. It uses Bitcoin as the 
underlying payment method and thus inherits the high-level of 
privacy offered by Bitcoin. The authors in [6] argued that the 
Ethereum BC can be used to distributedly create secure and 
private smart contracts between vehicle owners and service 
providers. However, a system that supports this is yet to be 
designed. In our previous work [7], we proposed an optimized 
BC instantiation for the Internet of Things (IoT) called 
Lightweight Scalable Blockchain (LSB). 
 The main contribution of this article is to present a 
decentralized privacy-preserving and secure BC-based 
architecture for the smart vehicle ecosystem. Smart vehicles, 
OEMs (i.e. car manufacturers) and other service providers 
jointly form an overlay network where they can communicate 
with each other. We base our design on LSB (a short overview 
is in the next section) due to its low overheads. Nodes in the 
overlay are clustered and only the Cluster Heads (CHs) are 
responsible for managing the BC and performing its core 
functions. These nodes are thus known as Overlay Block 
Managers (OBMs). Transactions are broadcast to and verified 
by the OBMs, thus eliminating the need for a central broker. To 
protect user privacy, each vehicle is equipped with an in-
vehicle storage to store privacy sensitive data, e.g. location 
traces. The vehicle owner defines which data (and the 
granularity) is provided to third parties in trade for beneficial 
services and which data should be stored in the in-vehicle 
storage. Consequently, the owner has finer control over the 
exchanged data.  
Vehicles can be mobile while communicating with the overlay. 
A vehicle that is physically distant from its associated OBM, 
may experience increased latency. To address this challenge, 
we propose to use a soft handover method (similar to Mobile IP 
[8]), wherein, the vehicle associates with a different OBM that 
is closer to its current location. 
All transactions (i.e. communications) in the network are 
encrypted using asymmetric encryption. Nodes are 
authenticated using their PKs. Strong communication security 
and authentication introduced by BC mitigates the risk that the 
vehicle may be remotely hacked and thus increases the safety 
of the passengers.  
Overview of LSB  
 
Conventional BC instantiations suffers from high (processing 
and packet) overhead and low scalability and throughput. The 
consensus algorithm employed in BC involves solving a hard-
to-solve easy-to-verify puzzle that consumes significant 
computational resources. All transactions and blocks are 
broadcast to the entire network which results in pronounced 
packet overhead. Additionally, this raises a scalability issue as 
the number of broadcast packets increases quadratically with 
the number of participating nodes.  The throughput of the BC is 
defined as the number of transactions that are stored in BC per 
second. Conventional BCs have limited throughput, e.g. 
Bitcoin throughput is restricted to seven transactions per 
second due to the complexity of the consensus algorithm. In 
our recent work [7], we developed a new BC instantiation, 
called LSB, that addresses the aforementioned challenges. 
LSB is optimized for the IoT and large-scale low resource 
networks. LSB replaces the demand for solving a 
computational puzzle with a scheduled block generation 
process, thus eliminating the significant processing overhead of 
conventional BCs. Each node is permitted to store one block 
during a specific time period. To address the scalability 
challenge, LSB clusters the network and only the CHs (i.e. 
OBMs) manage the BC. LSB dynamically adjusts the 
throughput using a Distributed Throughput Management 
(DTM) method to ensure that the BC throughput does not 
significantly deviate from the transaction load generated by the 
nodes in the network. LSB uses a distributed trust algorithm to 
decrease the processing time associated with validating blocks. 
As shown in Figure 2, as more blocks are stored in BC, the 
processing time for validating new blocks in LSB is 
significantly lower compared to Bitcoin BC, which can be 
attributed to a novel distributed trust algorithm. In this article, 
we use LSB as the underlying BC technology motivated by its 
salient features outlined above.  
Nodes use transactions to communicate with other nodes in the 
overlay. There are two types of transactions based on the 
 
Figure 2.  An evaluation of the processing time for validating 
new blocks [7]. 
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number of signatures that must be validated:  
1) Single signature: A single signature transaction 
requires one signature, which is the signature of the 
transaction generator, to be considered valid. The 
structure of this transaction is as follow:  
“T_ID || P_T_ID || PK || Sig” 
T_ID is the ID of the current transaction, which is the 
hash of the transaction. P_T_ID is the ID of the 
previous transaction of the transaction generator. It is 
used to link subsequent transactions of the same 
node, thereby creating a transaction ledger for that 
node. This is followed by the PK and signature (Sig) 
of the transaction generator.  
2) Multisig: A multisig transaction requires two 
signatures, which are the signature of the transaction 
generator and recipient, to be considered valid. The 
structure of this transaction is as follows: 
“T_ID || P_T_ID || PK.1 || Sig.1 || PK.2 || Sig.2” 
T_ID and P_T_ID are the IDs of the current and 
previous transaction, respectively. The subsequent 
fields contain the PK and signature (Sig) of the 
transaction generator and recipient.  
 All transactions are broadcast to all OBMs. An OBM checks 
the validity of the received transaction by verifying the affixed 
signature(s). If the transaction is valid, then it is stored in a 
pool of valid transactions which will be collated to form a 
block with a pre-defined block size, i.e., the total number of 
transactions stored in the block. A multisig transaction that 
arrives at the OBM may yet need to signed by the recipient, 
particularly when the recipient belongs to the cluster of that 
OBM. Each OBM maintains a list of PK pairs (essentially an 
access control list) which establishes the nodes that are allowed 
to communicated with each other. The cluster members (i.e., 
overlay nodes) upload key pairs to the key list of their OBM to 
allow other overlay nodes to access them. If the OBM finds a 
PK pair in its list that matches with the PKs in the transaction 
(PK.1/PK.2), then it forwards the transaction to the 
corresponding node that uploaded the key pair. Otherwise, the 
transaction is broadcast to other OBMs. Figure 3 summarizes 
key LSB functions performed by an OBM.    
BlockChain-Based Architecture  
In this section, we discuss the details of the proposed BC-based 
architecture for automotive security and privacy.  The main 
part of our architecture is the overlay where a public BC is 
managed by the overlay nodes which can be smart vehicles, 
OEMs, vehicle assembly lines, SW providers, cloud storage 
providers, and mobile devices of users such as smartphones, 
laptops, or tablets. Figure 4 shows the overlay network.  
Each vehicle is equipped with a Wireless Vehicle Interface 
(WVI) and local storage, such as a micro SD card. The WVI 
connects the vehicle to the overlay. The in-vehicle storage is 
used to store privacy sensitive data, e.g. location and 
maintenance history, to protect the privacy of the user. The 
vehicle generates single signature transactions in pre-defined 
time intervals containing the signed hash of the data stored in 
the in-vehicle storage. This transaction is sent to the OBM that 
the vehicle is associated with and thus stored in the BC. At a 
later time, the vehicle can prove that the data within its storage 
has not being changed by verifying the hash contained in this 
transaction.  As the in-vehicle storage has limited capacity, a 
back-up storage can be considered in the smart home of the 
vehicle owner. The vehicle periodically transfers data from the 
in-vehicle storage to the backup storage. In this instance, the 
hash of the backup storage is stored in the BC.  
Overlay transactions are broadcast and verified by the OBMs. 
An OBM verifies a transaction by validating the signature of 
the transaction participants with their PK. Additionally, the 
OBM verifies if the previous transaction of each transaction, 
which is stored in the P_T_ID field, exists in the public BC.  
Recall that, in BC each node is known by a changeable PK. 
Changing the PK for each transaction introduces a high level of 
privacy. However, in some instances other nodes may need to 
identify the real-world identity of a PK owner, e.g. the vehicles 
need to know the PK of their OEM so that they can trust 
requests sent from the OEM. To address this challenge, nodes 
whose identity should be known, including SW providers, 
Figure 4: An overview of the overlay. 
Figure 3. A summary of the Overlay Block Manager (OBM) 
functions in LSB 
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Figure 5. WRSU process utilizing the BC architecture. 
 
OEMs, and cloud storage, share a PK that is certified by a 
third-party CA. Other overlay nodes can verify the CA’s 
certificate to confirm the identity of these nodes. Note that, we 
rely on a centralized approach, i.e., existing public key 
infrastructure for this aspect of identity verification. However, 
the rest of the functionality is achieved by our proposed 
distributed architecture. It is worth noting that the 
aforementioned nodes can also use changeable PKs for 
transactions where their identity is to be kept private. 
Recall that the overlay is clustered and cluster members use the  
OBM that they are associated with (i.e. CH), to send and 
receive transactions from the overlay. As vehicles move, they 
may experience extended delays in receiving responses from 
their OBM due to increased communication delays. We 
propose a solution that is based on the soft handover method 
[8]. When a vehicle moves to a new location, it measures the 
communication delay with multiple OBMs in its neighborhood. 
The OBM with the lowest delay is selected as the new OBM. 
Then, the vehicle updates the key list in this new OBM with a 
set of key pairs that allows other nodes to send transactions to 
this vehicle. Finally, the vehicle disconnects from the previous 
OBM, which clears the entries within its key list for the 
vehicle. Note that, as all transactions are broadcast to all 
OBMs, the new OBM will receive the transactions of the new 
vehicle that joined its cluster and thus this vehicle will continue 
to maintain connectivity with the rest of the overlay.  In case 
the vehicle fails to find a suitable new OBM, e.g. if the OBMs 
are sparsely distributed, then the vehicle remains associated 
with the original OBM.  
Applications  
In this section, we discuss various applications which can 
leverage the proposed architecture. Table 1 summarizes the key 
benefits of using BC compared to existing methods in each 
application which are discussed in more detail in the rest of the 
article.  
Remote Software Updates   
The process of upgrading the functionality of the Electronic 
Control Units (ECU) of a vehicle or fixing a bug in the SW 
installed on one of the ECUs is known as Wireless Remote SW  
Update (WRSU). WRSU can be utilized during the vehicle  
development and assembly as well as for maintenance of the 
vehicle in a service center [9] or remotely from home. Securing 
WRSU is one of the most critical challenges in the automotive 
ecosystem, as it requires full access to the vehicle and its 
embedded control systems. Current security architectures are 
centralized, e.g. Tesla utilizes a VPN to perform remote 
software updates, which would not necessarily scale for very 
large number of smart vehicles. Furthermore, these 
architectures do not address the privacy issues outlined in the 
Introduction. Thus, WRSU demands a distributed security 
method while maintaining the vehicle owner’s privacy.  
The entire SW update process based on our architecture is 
sketched in Figure 5 and described in the following. Each OEM 
uses a cloud storage to store new SW updates so that its users 
can download the SW update. An account is created in the 
cloud storage for each vehicle by the OEM, and the account is 
associated with a public/private key pair. The keys are used to 
authorize and authenticate nodes who request to download the 
SW update.  
First, the SW provider, which can be a specific department of 
the OEM or a supplier providing the ECU with the embedded 
SW, creates a new SW version and stores it in the cloud storage 
provided by the OEM (step 1 in Figure 5). Then, the SW 
provider creates a multisig transaction (see Section A 
background on BC) and populates its own PK in PK.1 field. 
The signed hash of the stored SW binary in the cloud is added 
to the Sig.1 field. As the binary is stored in the cloud, the hash 
can be verified by other overlay nodes thereby ensuring data 
integrity. Following this the SW provider populates the PK of 
the OEM in PK.2 field. Recall that OBMs use a key list to 
decide on how to forward a transaction. The SW provider sends 
the resulting multisig transaction to its OBM (step 2).   
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 OBMs broadcast the transaction (step 3). The OBM of the 
cluster containing the concerned OEM, finds the match in its  
key list and thus forwards the transaction to the OEM (step 4). 
The OEM verifies the new SW version and signs the received 
transaction, by populating Sig.2 field. Then, the OEM sends the 
transaction to its OBM (step 5) which is then broadcast to all 
OBMs. The OBMs verify the multisig transaction by checking 
the signature of both the SW provider and the OEM using the 
PKs included in the transaction. Next, the OBMs notify their 
cluster members, i.e. vehicles, about the latest available SW 
update (step 6).  
On receiving the transaction from the OBM, the smart vehicle 
verifies it by ensuring that the PK.2 filed in the transaction 
equates with the PK of its OEM. The vehicle subsequently 
downloads the SW directly from the cloud storage (step 7). 
Recall that each vehicle has a public/private key pair to 
authenticate itself to the cloud. Next, the vehicle verifies the 
integrity of the downloaded binary by comparing the signed  
hash of the SW binary in the received transaction, from the  
OEM and SW provider, with the hash of the downloaded 
version. This ensures the integrity during WRSU.  
Insurance 
Insurance companies are beginning to offer flexible vehicle 
insurance fees to their responsible customers. For this, the 
company evaluates the driving behavior using data collected 
from the vehicles such as braking patterns and speed. We now 
discuss the suitability of our architecture for this application. 
Initially, when a car owner chooses such a flexible insurance 
model, the insurance company creates a public/private key pair 
for the car along with an account in a cloud storage. Thus, the 
insurance company knows the real identity of each account 
holder. The insurance company stores the PK in a secure 
database so that it can identify users later. The key pair is used 
by the vehicle for all subsequent communications (i.e. 
transactions) with the insurer. The vehicle stores data, e.g., 
braking pattern and speed, in the cloud storage using the 
provided account. This data is used by the insurance company 
to provide flexible insurance services to the user.  
The insurance company knows the identity of the owner of the 
vehicle which stores data in the cloud storage. This endangers 
the vehicle owner privacy as the exchanged data might contain 
privacy sensitive data, e.g. the location of the vehicle. To 
address this challenge, such privacy sensitive data that might 
not necessarily be required for offering insurance services to 
the owner are stored in the in-vehicle storage. When this data is 
demanded by the insurance company, e.g. when an accident 
happens, the vehicle sends the data stored in the in-vehicle 
storage to the insurance company to file an accident claim. 
Recall that the hash of the in-vehicle storage is stored in BC. 
Application Conventional Methods Advantages introduced by BC 
WRSU • Centralized – not scalable 
• Partial participation: not addressing the full 
chain starting from a SP all the way to a service 
center 
• Lack of privacy: a direct link between the 
vehicle and OEM can compromise the driver’s 
privacy (e.g., driver behavior or location) 
• Only OEM can verify communications or 
history of update downloads.  
• Distributed data exchange and security provides 
scalability 
• End-to-end: involving SP, OEMs, vehicles, 
service centers, assembly lines, etc. 
• Ensure privacy of the user (also for diagnostics) 
• Update history as well as authenticity of the SW 
can be publicly verified  
Insurance  • Current systems are often insecure, which 
endangers the vehicle’s integrity [10] 
• Users lack control over the exchanged data 
• Privacy-sensitive data must be continuously sent 
to the insurance company for receiving services 
• Secure, distributed, and privacy-preserving data 
exchange 
• Users control the exchanged data 
• Privacy-sensitive data is shared on demand (e.g., 
accident happened) instead of a continuous data 
exchange. Authenticity of data stored in the 
vehicle can be publicly confirmed 
Electric 
vehicles  
• Central payment and accounting 
• The location and behavior (e.g., using a specific 
charger on a specific day) of the user can be 
tracked. 
• Private and distributed security, payments and 
accounting  
• User data such as location information remain 
private 
Car-sharing 
services  
• Central payment and accounting 
• Users can be tracked by their identity  
• Central authorization  
• Private and distributed security, payments and 
accounting  
• Users use changeable identities 
• Distributed authorization  
 
Table 1. A summary of BC advantages compared to conventional methods employed for studied applications.  
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This hash can be used by the insurance company to ensure that 
the data has not been modified since the time when the hash is 
stored in BC. 
The vehicle owner may discontinue its contract with the 
insurance company or sell its vehicle. In such cases, the 
insurance company removes the vehicle account from the cloud 
storage, thus the vehicle is denied to receive further services 
and store data in the cloud storage.   
Electric Vehicles and Smart Charging Services 
The number of electric vehicles is constantly growing. This 
trend increases the demand for efficient and fast vehicle 
charging infrastructure. Interconnecting the smart vehicle to the 
owner’s smart home and mobile devices, could lead to several 
sophisticated services. For example, the charging process can 
become more personalized, if information about the travel 
habits of the user are made available (e.g. through their 
calendar). This information can be used to guarantee that the 
vehicle is fully charged when the user needs it while also 
choosing the most efficient and cheapest charging cycle such as 
by avoiding peak load times. 
The proposed security architecture allows the vehicle to 
exchange data with other IoT participants, e.g. smart home and 
smart devices of the user. These participants can be considered 
as the overlay nodes. The home (and vehicle) owner defines 
which information can be shared between these entities to 
protect his privacy while enabling novel services thus enriching 
the smart vehicle and its functionality. Blockcharge [5] can be 
used in conjunction with our method to pay the charging fees. 
Car-sharing Services 
Car sharing services, e.g. Car Next Door [11], are growing 
rapidly. Providing such highly distributed services requires the 
interconnection of smart vehicles, car-sharing service providers 
and the users of the services in a secure and reliable way. A 
trusted communication channel is needed to securely exchange 
data including the location of the vehicle, keys to unlock the 
car, and payment details of the user. The proposed security 
architecture is eminently suitable for these services as i) the 
decentralized nature of BC is tailor-made for these highly 
distributed services which include providing a user with the 
location of the car, handling the interconnection between the 
user and the car (i.e., to unlock and use the car) and 
payment/billing after using the car-sharing service, and ii) it 
interconnects the involved entities in a secure way while 
protecting the privacy of the users (e.g., no link between the 
real identity of an user and a certain route driven) and the 
vehicle from unauthorized access (i.e., only registered and 
authorized user are allowed to locate, unlock and use a 
vehicle).  
Security and Privacy Analysis   
In this section, we discuss the privacy and security of the 
proposed architecture. 
Privacy: The privacy of the proposed method is inherited from 
the BC where each node uses a unique PK to communicate 
with other overlay nodes. This prevents malicious nodes from 
tracking an overlay node. Each vehicle is equipped with an in-
vehicle storage to store privacy sensitive data. The vehicle 
owner can reveal data in the in-vehicle storage to the service 
providers in situations where this data is required (e.g. accident 
claim).  
An attacker might attempt to deanonymize a user by linking 
different pieces of data associated with the same anonymous 
user (i.e., linking the PKs of the user). This attack, known as 
linking attack, endangers the privacy of the user. To protect 
against this attack, each user uses a fresh key for each of its 
interactions in the overlay.  
Security: The security provided by our architecture can be 
largely attributed to the use of BC. Each transaction in BC 
contains the hash of the data which ensures integrity. All 
transactions are encrypted using asymmetric encryption 
methods which provide confidentiality. Recall that the OBMs 
maintain a key list that provides access control for cluster 
members in a way that only transactions for which the 
embedded PKs match with the key list in the OBM can be 
forwarded to a cluster member.  
In the following, we evaluate the resilience of the proposed 
architecture to selected security attacks. Thereby, we focus on 
attacks affecting the security of a smart vehicle and define 
different attack scenarios that allow an attacker to take control 
of a vehicle:  
Changing a software binary in the cloud: The attacker may 
seek to gain access to the cloud storage and manipulate the 
software binary with the goal of injecting malware to a large 
number of vehicles. In such instances, the hash of the infected 
binary differs from the hash included in the multisig transaction 
which is signed by the SW provider and the OEM. Thus, the 
vehicles can readily detect such an attack prior to installing the 
infected SW update. 
Distributing a false update by claiming to be the OEM or 
SW update provider: The overlay nodes know the PK of the 
OEM and the SW provider. Therefore, the attacker cannot 
claim to be either of these entities as it requires the private key 
associated with the PK of the relevant entities.   
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack: To orchestrate 
a DDoS attack, it is necessary to compromise a large number of 
vehicles in the overlay. The compromised vehicles send a large 
number of transactions to a targeted overlay node in order to 
overwhelm it. Recall that transactions are broadcast to all 
OBMs. An OBM forwards a transaction to a cluster member 
only if the keys in the transaction (i.e. PK.1 and PK.2) match 
with a key pair in the key list of the OBM. The overlay nodes 
authorize requesters to access them by uploading a key pair in 
the key list of the OBM. The transactions that are part of the 
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DDoS attack would not generate a match in the key list and 
would thus be dropped and not impact the targeted node. 
Future Research Directions  
In this section, we summarize future research directions:  
• Key management: Each vehicle owns multiple keys 
for communication with SPs or users, which may 
change during the vehicle lifetime. Managing keys 
introduces a new research challenge.  
• Caching data: Each connected vehicle, must 
download data, e.g. SW update, from a cloud which 
incurs packet overhead and delay in the overlay. 
Introducing caching in OBMs can reduce such 
overhead.  
• Applications: The proposed architecture suits a 
broader range of applications, e.g. congestion 
control, that can be explored in more detail. 
• Mobility: Frequent mobility of the vehicles increases 
the packet and processing overhead resulting from 
the handover process. New mobility-friendly 
methods can be introduced to reduce this overhead.   
Conclusion  
In this article, we proposed a novel automotive security 
architecture based on BlockChain (BC). Due to its distributed 
nature, the proposed architecture eliminates the need for a 
centralized control and allows novel automotive services.  
The privacy of the users is ensured by using changeable Public 
Keys (PK). The security of our architecture is largely inherited 
from the strong security properties of the underlying BC 
technology. Additionally, the OBMs provide access control for 
transactions sent to their cluster members. The architecture is 
able to support emerging automotive services by providing a 
secure and trustworthy way to exchange data while protecting 
the security of the end user. 
We discussed several automotive use cases to illustrate the 
applicability of the proposed architecture. Additionally, we 
described possible attack scenarios and discuss how the 
proposed architecture is able to mitigate and inhibit these 
attacks.  
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